[연세대 손열 교수] 무역을 통한 한국의 중견국외교

<요약해서 다시 정리해놓기>

1. South Korea Can Seek Ways to Assuage “Over-Securitization” of Trade Relations.

The TPP seems politically divisive because China is not included. The TPP might cause trade diversion effects against China, but it will not critically affect the seemingly ever-expanding Chinese economy. Risks to the U.S. economy caused by the RCEP or CJK are minimal. in fact, as long as the U.S. concludes the TPP deal first, the U.S. will hardly feel threatened by the RCEP and CJK. It does not matter whether the RCEP materializes or not. The question is about how threatened China feels by the TPP. In this regard, the speed by which RCEP and CJK negotiations proceed is important. If RCEP and CJK negotiations make progress, China will not feel isolated by the US-led TPP network. As more dual membership countries come out, it will decrease China’s fear and its tendency to over-securitize the trade architecture. South Korea’s role is to help in promoting the RCEP and CJK in parallel with TPP negotiations.

2. South Korea Should Lead a Middle Power Network to Propagate Against the View that Sees the Regional Free-Trade Agenda Reduced to a Sino-American Relationship. 

Many see that China or the U.S. may end up having veto power over any regional agreement that may develop. This situation is not conducive for all countries in the region, so where opportunities exist for middle power countries to make a deal to their mutual benefit, they should grasp those opportunities and do so by convening mechanisms where middle powers come together in sharing common interests.

3. The Most Important Task is Designing a New Regional Trade Architecture. 

At the November 2014 APEC Summit meeting, China showed its preference of promoting the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). In contrast to the American position, which views the TPP as a building block for a FTAAP. The Chinese proposal of a FTAAP is seen as sort-of-a bridge between the TPP and RCEP. Either way, the FTAAP would create a substantially larger FTA than either of the other currently negotiated pacts such as the TPP and the RCEP.

What is needed is designing an architecture where these two trade networks can evolve to coexist. One potential solution is functional differentiation. Given the TPP is already identified as a high-quality, comprehensive FTA, it is desirable to define the RCEP as functionally different but still compatible with the TPP. The South Korean role is taking the initiative in elaborating the RCEP’s objectives that supports and contributes to regional economic integration, equitable economic development, and strengthening economic cooperation between advanced industrial and developing countries. With successful brokerage, a harmonious regional economic architecture can emerge, and ultimately, help to establish regional complex networks that can assuage potential conflicts in the making of a regional security architecture rivaled by two superpowers.

4. Seoul Can Play a Broker Role in CJK FTA Negotiations. 

Given the extensive cross-border production networks or supply chains among the three economies, trade needs complex rules rather than tariff reductions. In this regard, South Korea will need to take prudent action that puts less weight on tariff concessions than trade rule making. This is partly because many hurdles arising from the conflicting interests exist in negotiations over tariff concessions. It will be a smart strategy to lead the other two rivals to stay focused on negotiating trade rules including ROOs, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), competition policy, and regulatory rules while keeping a tariff concession level that is not too high. In the end, Seoul can help shape the deal as a standard for the future rules in RCEP. In doing so, the three-way standard should be designed for plasticity and scalability.

5. The Government Needs to Better Prepare for Multilateral Diplomacy in Trade.

The recent government reorganization of trade negotiations: detaching trade negotiation functions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade submerged into the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (previously the Ministry of Industry and Energy), renamed as the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE); was aimed at fostering closer relations between industries and trade in dealing with trade issues and negotiations. This domestically oriented move has generated some concerns over the government’s strategic response to the increasing need of middle power diplomacy in multilateral settings. Given the undeniable geopolitical competition between the U.S.- Japan and China in the region, Korea’s trade policy requires a critical understanding of the complex nature of trade issues and a balanced approach in a turbulent region. The government needs to address these concerns and proactively engage with trade diplomacy in order to secure prosperity and peace in the region.

<Policy Recommendation for South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy: Trade - Yul Sohn, Yonsei University>